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Domingo, Abril 08, 2012

Manuscrito hallado en un bolsillo

Por Julio Cortázar
Ahora que lo escribo, para otros esto podría haber sido la ruleta o el hipódromo, pero no era dinero lo que buscaba, en algún momento había empezado a sentir, a decidir que un vidrio de ventanilla en el metro podía traerme la respuesta, el encuentro con una felicidad, precisamente aquí donde todo ocurre bajo el signo de la más implacable ruptura, dentro de un tiempo bajo tierra que un trayecto entre estaciones dibuja y limita así, inapelablemente abajo. Digo ruptura para comprender mejor (tendría que comprender tantas cosas desde que empecé a jugar el juego) esa esperanza de una convergencia que tal vez me fuera dada desde el reflejo en un vidrio de ventanilla. Rebasar la ruptura que la gente no parece advertir aunque vaya a saber lo que piensa esa gente agobiada que sube y baja de los vagones del metro, lo que busca además del transporte esa gente que sube antes o después para bajar después o antes, que sólo coincide en una zona de vagón donde todo está decidido por adelantado sin que nadie pueda saber si saldremos juntos, si yo bajaré primero o ese hombre flaco con un rollo de papeles, si la vieja de verde seguirá hasta el final, si esos niños bajarán ahora, está claro que bajarán porque recogen sus cuadernos y sus reglas, se acercan riendo y jugando a la puerta mientras allá en el ángulo hay una muchacha que se instala para durar, para quedarse todavía muchas estaciones en el asiento por fin libre, y esa otra muchacha es imprevisible, Ana era imprevisible, se mantenía muy derecha contra el respaldo en el asiento de la ventanilla, ya estaba ahí cuando subí en la estación Etienne Marcel y un negro abandonó el asiento de enfrente y a nadie pareció interesarle y yo pude resbalar con una vaga excusa entre las rodillas de los dos pasajeros sentados en los asientos exteriores y quedé frente a Ana y casi enseguida, porque había bajado al metro para jugar una vez más el juego, busqué el perfil de Margrit en el reflejo del vidrio de la ventanilla y pensé que era bonita, que me gustaba su pelo negro con una especie de ala breve que le peinaba en diagonal la frente.

No es verdad que el nombre de Margrit o de Ana viniera después o que sea ahora una manera de diferenciarlas en la escritura, cosas así se daban decididas instantáneamente por el juego, quiero decir que de ninguna manera el reflejo en el vidrio de la ventanilla podía llamarse Ana, así como tampoco podía llamarse Margrit la muchacha sentada frente a mí sin mirarme, con los ojos perdidos en el hastío de ese interregno en el que todo el mundo parece consultar una zona de visión que no es la circundante, salvo los niños que miran fijo y de lleno en las cosas hasta el día en que les enseñan a situarse también en los intersticios, a mirar sin ver con esa ignorancia civil de toda apariencia vecina, de todo contacto sensible, cada uno instalado en su burbuja, alineado entre paréntesis, cuidando la vigencia del mínimo aire libre entre rodillas y codos ajenos, refugiándose en France-Soir o en libros de bolsillo aunque casi siempre como Ana, unos ojos situándose en el hueco entre lo verdaderamente mirable, en esa distancia neutra y estúpida que iba de mi cara a la del hombre concentrado en el Figaro. Pero entonces Margrit, si algo podía yo prever era que en algún momento Ana se volvería distraída hacia la ventanilla y entonces Margrit vería mi reflejo, el cruce de miradas en las imágenes de ese vidrio donde la oscuridad del túnel pone su azogue atenuado, su felpa morada y moviente que da a las caras una vida en otros planos, les quita esa horrible máscara de tiza de las luces municipales del vagón y sobre todo, oh sí, no hubieras podido negarlo, Margrit, las hace mirar de verdad esa otra cara del cristal porque durante el tiempo instantáneo de la doble mirada no hay censura, mi reflejo en el vidrio no era el hombre sentado frente a Ana y que Ana no debía mirar de lleno en un vagón de metro, y además la que estaba mirando mi reflejo ya no era Ana sino Margrit en el momento en que Ana había desviado rápidamente los ojos del hombre sentado frente a ella porque no estaba bien que lo mirara, al volverse hacia el cristal de la ventanilla había visto mi reflejo que esperaba ese instante para levemente sonreír sin insolencia ni esperanza cuando la mirada de Margrit cayera como un pájaro en su mirada. Debió durar un segundo, acaso algo más porque sentí que Margrit había advertido esa sonrisa que Ana reprobaba aunque no fuera más que por el gesto de bajar la cara, de examinar vagamente el cierre de su bolso de cuero rojo; y era casi justo seguir sonriendo aunque ya Margrit no me mirara porque de alguna manera el gesto de Ana acusaba mi sonrisa, la seguía sabiendo y ya no era necesario que ella o Margrit me miraran, concentradas aplicadamente en la nimia tarea de comprobar el cierre del bolso rojo.

Como ya con Paula (con Ofelia) y con tantas otras que se habían concentrado en la tarea de verificar un cierre, un botón, el pliegue de una revista, una vez más fue el pozo donde la esperanza se enredaba con el temor en un calambre de arañas a muerte, donde el tiempo empezaba a latir como un segundo corazón en el pulso del juego; desde ese momento cada estación del metro era una trama diferente del futuro porque así lo había decidido el juego; la mirada de Margrit y mi sonrisa, el retroceso instantáneo de Ana a la contemplación del cierre de su bolso eran la apertura de una ceremonia que alguna vez había empezado a celebrar contra todo lo razonable, prefiriendo los peores desencuentros a las cadenas estúpidas de una causalidad cotidiana. Explicarlo no es difícil pero jugarlo tenía mucho de combate a ciegas, de temblorosa suspensión coloidal en la que todo derrotero alzaba un árbol de imprevisible recorrido. Un plano del metro de París define en su esqueleto mondrianesco, en sus ramas rojas, amarillas, azules y negras una vasta pero limitada superficie de subtendidos seudópodos: y ese árbol está vivo veinte horas de cada veinticuatro, una savia atormentada lo recorre con finalidades precisas, la que baja en Chatelet o sube en Vaugirard, la que en Odeón cambia para seguir a La Motte-Picquet, las doscientas, trescientas, vaya a saber cuántas posibilidades de combinación para que cada célula codificada y programada ingrese en un sector del árbol y aflore en otro, salga de las Galeries Lafayette para depositar un paquete de toallas o una lámpara en un tercer piso de la rue Gay-Lussac.

Mi regla del juego era maniáticamente simple, era bella, estúpida y tiránica, si me gustaba una mujer, si me gustaba una mujer sentada frente a mí, si me gustaba una mujer sentada frente a mí junto a la ventanilla, si su reflejo en la ventanilla cruzaba la mirada con mi reflejo en la ventanilla, si mi sonrisa en el reflejo de la ventanilla turbaba o complacía o repelía al reflejo de la mujer en la ventanilla, si Margrit me veía sonreír y entonces Ana bajaba la cabeza y empezaba a examinar aplicadamente el cierre de su bolso rojo, entonces había juego, daba exactamente lo mismo que la sonrisa fuera acatada o respondida o ignorada, el primer tiempo de la ceremonia no iba más allá de eso, una sonrisa registrada por quien la había merecido. Entonces empezaba el combate en el pozo, las arañas en el estómago, la espera con su péndulo de estación en estación. Me acuerdo de cómo me acordé ese día: ahora eran Margrit y Ana, pero una semana atrás habían sido Paula y Ofelia, la chica rubia había bajado en una de las peores estaciones, Montparnasse-Bienvenue que abre su hidra maloliente a las máximas posibilidades de fracaso. Mi combinación era con la línea de la Porte de Vanves y casi enseguida, en el primer pasillo, comprendí que Paula (que Ofelia) tomaría el corredor que llevaba a la combinación con la Mairie d'Issy. Imposible hacer nada, sólo mirarla por última vez en el cruce de los pasillos, verla alejarse, descender una escalera. La regla del juego era ésa, una sonrisa en el cristal de la ventanilla y el derecho de seguir a una mujer y esperar desesperadamente que su combinación coincidiera con la decidida por mí antes de cada viaje; y entonces -siempre, hasta ahora- verla tomar otro pasillo y no poder seguirla, obligado a volver al mundo de arriba y entrar en un café y seguir viviendo hasta que poco a poco, horas o días o semanas, la sed de nuevo reclamando la posibilidad de que todo coincidiera alguna vez, mujer y cristal de ventanilla, sonrisa aceptada o repelida, combinación de trenes y entonces por fin sí, entonces el derecho de acercarme y decir la primera palabra, espesa de estancado tiempo, de inacabable merodeo en el fondo del pozo entre las arañas del calambre. Ahora entrábamos en la estación Saint-Sulpice, alguien a mi lado se enderezaba y se iba, también Ana se quedaba sola frente a mí, había dejado de mirar el bolso y una o dos veces sus ojos me barrieron distraídamente antes de perderse en el anuncio del balneario termal que se repetía en los cuatro ángulos del vagón. Margrit no había vuelto a mirarme en la ventanilla pero eso probaba el contacto, su latido sigiloso; Ana era acaso tímida o simplemente le parecía absurdo aceptar el reflejo de esa cara que volvería a sonreír para Margrit; y además llegar a Saint-Sulpice era importante porque si todavía faltaban ocho estaciones hasta el fin del recorrido en la Porte d'Orléans, sólo tres tenían combinaciones con otras líneas, y sólo si Ana bajaba en una de esas tres me quedaría la posibilidad de coincidir; cuando el tren empezaba a frenar en Saint-Placide miré y miré a Margrit buscándole los ojos que Ana seguía apoyando blandamente en las cosas del vagón como admitiendo que Margrit no me miraría más, que era inútil esperar que volviera a mirar el reflejo que la esperaba para sonreírle.

No bajó en Saint-Placide, lo supe antes de que el tren empezara a frenar, hay ese apresto del viajero, sobre todo de las mujeres que nerviosamente verifican paquetes, se ciñen el abrigo o miran de lado al levantarse, evitando rodillas en ese instante en que la pérdida de velocidad traba y atonta los cuerpos. Ana repasaba vagamente los anuncios de la estación, la cara de Margrit se fue borrando bajo las luces del andén y no pude saber si había vuelto a mirarme; tampoco mi reflejo hubiera sido visible en esa marea de neón y anuncios fotográficos, de cuerpos entrando y saliendo. Si Ana bajaba en Montparnasse-Bienvenue mis posibilidades era mínimas; cómo no acordarme de Paula (de Ofelia) allí donde una cuádruple combinación posible adelgazaba toda previsión; y sin embargo el día de Paula (de Ofelia) había estado absurdamente seguro de que coincidiríamos, hasta último momento había marchado a tres metros de esa mujer lenta y rubia, vestida como con hojas secas, y su bifurcación a la derecha me había envuelto la cara como un latigazo. Por eso ahora Margrit no, por eso el miedo, de nuevo podía ocurrir abominablemente en Montparnasse-Bienvenue; el recuerdo de Paula (de Ofelia), las arañas en el pozo contra la menuda confianza en que Ana (en que Margrit). Pero quién puede contra esa ingenuidad que nos va dejando vivir, casi inmediatamente me dije que tal vez Ana (que tal vez Margrit) no bajaría en Montparnasse-Bienvenue sino en una de las otras estaciones posibles, que acaso no bajaría en las intermedias donde no me estaba dado seguirla; que Ana (que Margrit) no bajaría en Montparnasse-Bienvenue (no bajó), que no bajaría en Vavin, y no bajó, que acaso bajaría en Raspail que era la primera de las dos últimas posibles; y cuando no bajó y supe que sólo quedaba una estación en la que podría seguirla contra las tres finales en que ya todo daba lo mismo, busqué de nuevo los ojos de Margrit en el vidrio de la ventanilla, la llamé desde un silencio y una inmovilidad que hubieran debido llegarle como un reclamo, como un oleaje, le sonreí con la sonrisa que Ana ya no podía ignorar, que Margrit tenía que admitir aunque no mirara mi reflejo azotado por las semiluces del túnel desembocando en Denfert-Rochereau. Tal vez el primer golpe de frenos había hecho temblar el bolso rojo en los muslos de Ana, tal vez sólo el hastío le movía la mano hasta el mechón negro cruzándole la frente; en esos tres, cuatro segundos en que el tren se inmovilizaba en el andén, las arañas clavaron sus uñas en la piel del pozo para una vez más vencerme desde adentro; cuando Ana se enderezó con una sola y limpia flexión de su cuerpo, cuando la vi de espaldas entre dos pasajeros, creo que busqué todavía absurdamente el rostro de Margrit en el vidrio enceguecido de luces y movimientos. Salí como sin saberlo, sombra pasiva de ese cuerpo que bajaba al andén, hasta despertar a lo que iba a venir, a la doble elección final cumpliéndose irrevocable.

Pienso que está claro, Ana (Margrit) tomaría un camino cotidiano o circunstancial, mientras antes de subir a ese tren yo había decidido que si alguien entraba en el juego y bajaba en Denfert-Rochereau, mi combinación sería la línea Nation-Etoile, de la misma manera que si Ana (que si Margrit) hubiera bajado en Châtelet sólo hubiera podido seguirla en caso de que tomara la combinación Vincennes-Neuilly. En el último tiempo de la ceremonia el juego estaba perdido si Ana (si Margrit) tomaba la combinación de la Ligne de Sceaux o salía directamente a la calle; inmediatamente, ya mismo porque en esa estación no había los interminables pasillos de otras veces y las escaleras llevaban rápidamente a destino, a eso que en los medios de transporte también se llamaba destino. La estaba viendo moverse entre la gente, su bolso rojo como un péndulo de juguete, alzando la cabeza en busca de los carteles indicadores, vacilando un instante hasta orientarse hacia la izquierda; pero la izquierda era la salida que llevaba a la calle.

No sé cómo decirlo, las arañas mordían demasiado, no fui deshonesto en el primer minuto, simplemente la seguí para después quizá aceptar, dejarla irse por cualquiera de sus rumbos allá arriba; a mitad de la escalera comprendí que no, que acaso la única manera de matarlas era negar por una vez la ley, el código. El calambre que me había crispado en ese segundo en que Ana (en que Margrit) empezaba a subir la escalera vedada, cedía de golpe a una lasitud soñolienta, a un gólem de lentos peldaños; me negué a pensar, bastaba saber que la seguía viendo, que el bolso rojo subía hacia la calle, que a cada paso el pelo negro le temblaba en los hombros. Ya era de noche y el aire estaba helado, con algunos copos de nieve entre ráfagas y llovizna; sé que Ana (que Margrit) no tuvo miedo cuando me puse a su lado y le dije: "No puede ser que nos separemos así, antes de habernos encontrado".

En el café, más tarde, ya solamente Ana mientras el reflejo de Margrit cedía a una realidad de cinzano y de palabras, me dijo que no comprendía nada, que se llamaba Marie-Claude, que mi sonrisa en el reflejo le había hecho daño, que por un momento había pensado en levantarse y cambiar de asiento, que no me había visto seguirla y que en la calle no había tenido miedo, contradictoriamente, mirándome en los ojos, bebiendo su cinzano, sonriendo sin avergonzarse de sonreír, de haber aceptado casi enseguida mi acoso en plena calle. En ese momento de una felicidad como de oleaje boca arriba de abandono a un deslizarse lleno de álamos, no podía decirle lo que ella hubiera entendido como locura o manía y que lo era pero de otro modo, desde otras orillas de la vida; le hablé de su mechón de pelo, de su bolso rojo, de su manera de mirar el anuncio de las termas, de que no le había sonreído por donjuanismo ni aburrimiento sino para darle una flor que no tenía, el signo de que me gustaba, de que me hacía bien, de que viajar frente a ella, de que otro cigarrillo y otro cinzano. En ningún momento fuimos enfáticos, hablamos como desde un ya conocido y aceptado, mirándonos sin lastimarnos, yo creo que Marie-Claude me dejaba venir y estar en su presente como quizá Margrit hubiera respondido a mi sonrisa en el vidrio de no mediar tanto molde previo, tanto no tienes que contestar si te hablan en la calle o te ofrecen caramelos y quieren llevarte al cine, hasta que Marie-Claude, ya liberada de mi sonrisa a Margrit, Marie-Claude en la calle y el café había pensado que era una buena sonrisa, que el desconocido de ahí abajo no le había sonreído a Margrit para tantear otro terreno, y mi absurda manera de abordarla había sido la sola comprensible, la sola razón para decir que sí, que podíamos beber una copa y charlar en un café.

No me acuerdo de lo que pude contarle de mí, tal vez todo salvo el juego pero entonces tan poco, en algún momento nos reímos, alguien hizo la primera broma, descubrimos que nos gustaban los mismos cigarrillos y Catherine Deneuve, me dejó acompañarla hasta el portal de su casa, me tendió la mano con llaneza y consintió en el mismo café a la misma hora del martes. Tomé un taxi para volver a mi barrio, por primera vez en mí mismo como en un increíble país extranjero, repitiéndome que sí, que Marie-Claude, que Denfert-Rochereau, apretando los párpados para guardar mejor su pelo negro, esa manera de ladear la cabeza antes de hablar, de sonreír. Fuimos puntuales y nos contamos películas, trabajo, verificamos diferencias ideológicas parciales, ella seguía aceptándome como si maravillosamente le bastara ese presente sin razones, sin interrogación; ni siquiera parecía darse cuenta de que cualquier imbécil la hubiese creído fácil o tonta; acatando incluso que yo no buscara compartir la misma banqueta en el café, que en el tramo de la rue Froidevaux no le pasara el brazo por el hombro en el primer gesto de una intimidad, que sabiéndola casi sola -una hermana menor, muchas veces ausente del departamento en el cuarto piso- no le pidiera subir. Si algo no podía sospechar eran las arañas, nos habíamos encontrado tres o cuatro veces sin que mordieran, inmóviles en el pozo y esperando hasta el día en que lo supe como si no lo hubiera estado sabiendo todo el tiempo, pero los martes, llegar al café, imaginar que Marie-Claude ya estaría allí o verla entrar con sus pasos ágiles, su morena recurrencia que había luchado inocentemente contra las arañas otra vez despiertas, contra la transgresión del juego que sólo ella había podido defender sin más que darme una breve, tibia mano, sin más que ese mechón de pelo que se paseaba por su frente. En algún momento debió darse cuenta, se quedó mirándome callada, esperando; imposible ya que no me delatara el esfuerzo para hacer durar la tregua, para no admitir que volvían poco a poco a pesar de Marie-Claude, contra Marie-Claude que no podía comprender, que se quedaba mirándome callada, esperando; beber y fumar y hablarle, defendiendo hasta lo último el dulce interregno sin arañas, saber de su vida sencilla y a horario y hermana estudiante y alergias, desear tanto ese mechón negro que le peinaba la frente, desearla como un término, como de veras la última estación del último metro de la vida, y entonces el pozo, la distancia de mi silla a esa banqueta en la que nos hubiéramos besado, en la que mi boca hubiera bebido el primer perfume de Marie-Claude antes de llevármela abrazada hasta su casa, subir esa escalera, desnudarnos por fin de tanta ropa y tanta espera.

Entonces se lo dije, me acuerdo del paredón del cementerio y de que Marie-Claude se apoyó en él y me dejó hablar con la cara perdida en el musgo caliente de su abrigo, vaya a saber si mi voz le llegó con todas sus palabras, si fue posible que comprendiera; se lo dije todo, cada detalle del juego, las improbabilidades confirmadas desde tantas Paulas (desde tantas Ofelias) perdidas al término de un corredor, las arañas en cada final. Lloraba, la sentía temblar contra mí aunque siguiera abrigándome, sosteniéndome con todo su cuerpo apoyado en la pared de los muertos; no me preguntó nada, no quiso saber por qué ni desde cuándo, no se le ocurrió luchar contra una máquina montada por toda una vida a contrapelo de sí misma, de la ciudad y sus consignas, tan sólo ese llanto ahí como un animalito lastimado, resistiendo sin fuerza al triunfo del juego, a la danza exasperada de las arañas en el pozo.

En el portal de su casa le dije que no todo estaba perdido, que de los dos dependía intentar un encuentro legítimo; ahora ella conocía las reglas del juego, quizá nos fueran favorables puesto que no haríamos otra cosa que buscarnos. Me dijo que podría pedir quince días de licencia, viajar llevando un libro para que el tiempo fuera menos húmedo y hostil en el mundo de abajo, pasar de una combinación a otra, esperarme leyendo, mirando los anuncios. No quisimos pensar en la improbabilidad, en que acaso nos encontraríamos en un tren pero que no bastaba, que esta vez no se podría faltar a lo preestablecido; le pedí que no pensara, que dejara correr el metro, que no llorara nunca en esas dos semanas mientras yo la buscaba; sin palabras quedó entendido que si el plazo se cerraba sin volver a vernos o sólo viéndonos hasta que dos pasillos diferentes nos apartaran, ya no tendría sentido retornar al café, al portal de su casa. Al pie de esa escalera de barrio que una luz naranja tendía dulcemente hacia lo alto, hacia la imagen de Marie-Claude en su departamento, entre sus muebles, desnuda y dormida, la besé en el pelo, le acaricié las manos; ella no buscó mi boca, se fue apartando y la vi de espaldas, subiendo otra de las tantas escaleras que se las llevaban sin que pudiera seguirlas; volví a pie a mi casa, sin arañas, vacío y lavado para la nueva espera; ahora no podían hacerme nada, el juego iba a recomenzar como tantas otras veces pero con solamente Marie-Claude, el lunes bajando a la estación Couronnes por la mañana, saliendo en Max Dormoy en plena noche, el martes entrando en Crimée, el miércoles en Philippe Auguste, la precisa regla del juego, quince estaciones en las que cuatro tenían combinaciones, y entonces en la primera de las cuatro sabiendo que me tocaría seguir a la línea Sèvres-Montreuil como en la segunda tendría que tomar la combinación Clichy-Porte Dauphine, cada itinerario elegido sin razón especial porque no podía haber ninguna razón, Marie-Claude habría subido quizá cerca de su casa, en Denfert-Rochereau o en Corvisart, estaría cambiando en Pasteur para seguir hacia Falguière, el árbol mondrianesco con todas sus ramas secas, el azar de las tentaciones rojas, azules, blancas, punteadas; el jueves, el viernes, el sábado. Desde cualquier andén ver entrar los trenes, los siete u ocho vagones, consintiéndome mirar mientras pasaban cada vez más lentos, correrme hasta el final y subir a un vagón sin Marie-Claude, bajar en la estación siguiente y esperar otro tren, seguir hasta la primera estación para buscar otra línea, ver llegar los vagones sin Marie-Claude, dejar pasar un tren o dos, subir en el tercero, seguir hasta la terminal, regresar a una estación desde donde podía pasar a otra línea, decidir que sólo tomaría el cuarto tren, abandonar la búsqueda y subir a comer, regresar casi enseguida con un cigarrillo amargo y sentarme en un banco hasta el segundo, hasta el quinto tren. El lunes, el martes, el miércoles, el jueves, sin arañas porque todavía esperaba, porque todavía espero en este banco de la estación Chemin Vert, con esta libreta en la que una mano escribe para inventarse un tiempo que no sea solamente esa interminable ráfaga que me lanza hacia el sábado en que acaso todo habrá concluido, en que volveré solo y las sentiré despertarse y morder, sus pinzas rabiosas exigiéndome el nuevo juego, otras Marie-Claudes, otras Paulas, la reiteración después de cada fracaso, el recomienzo canceroso. Pero es jueves, es la estación Chemin Vert, afuera cae la noche, todavía cabe imaginar cualquier cosa, incluso puede no parecer demasiado increíble que en el segundo tren, que en el cuarto vagón, que Marie-Claude en un asiento contra la ventanilla, que haya visto y se enderece con un grito que nadie salvo yo puede escuchar así en plena cara, en plena carrera para saltar al vagón repleto, empujando a pasajeros indignados, murmurando excusas que nadie espera ni acepta, quedándome de pie contra el doble asiento ocupado por piernas y paraguas y paquetes, por Marie-Claude con su abrigo gris contra la ventanilla, el mechón negro que el brusco arranque del tren agita apenas como sus manos tiemblan sobre los muslos en una llamada que no tiene nombre, que es solamente eso que ahora va a suceder. No hay necesidad de hablarse, nada se podría decir sobre ese muro impasible y desconfiado de caras y paraguas entre Marie-Claude y yo; quedan tres estaciones que combinan con otras líneas, Marie-Claude deberá elegir una de ellas, recorrer el andén, seguir uno de los pasillos o buscar la escalera de salida, ajena a mi elección que esta vez no transgrediré. El tren entra en la estación Bastille y Marie-Claude sigue ahí, la gente baja y sube, alguien deja libre el asiento a su lado pero no me acerco, no puedo sentarme ahí, no puedo temblar junto a ella como ella estará temblando. Ahora vienen Ledru-Rollin y Froidherbe-Chaligny, en esas estaciones sin combinación Marie-Claude sabe que no puedo seguirla y no se mueve, el juego tiene que jugarse en Reuilly-Diderot o en Daumesnil; mientras el tren entra en Reuilly-Diderot aparto los ojos, no quiero que sepa, no quiero que pueda comprender que no es allí. Cuando el tren arranca veo que no se ha movido, que nos queda una última esperanza, en Daumesnil hay tan sólo una combinación y la salida a la calle, rojo o negro, sí o no. Entonces nos miramos, Marie-Claude ha alzado la cara para mirarme de lleno, aferrado al barrote del asiento soy eso que ella mira, algo tan pálido como lo que estoy mirando, la cara sin sangre de Marie-Claude que aprieta el bolso rojo, que va a hacer el primer gesto para levantarse mientras el tren entra en la estación Daumesnil.



http://findelmundo.com.ar/belengache/cortazar2.htm

Quarta-feira, Dezembro 28, 2011

Was pope John xxiii named in reference of pope John xxii from Avignon as cite in Il nome della Rosa wrote by Umberto Eco? The debate over the poverty of Christ and his apostles under Pope John XXII (1316-1334) is one of the most famous intellectual controversies of the Middle Ages. The previous pope named John was Pope John XXI. The last pope named John before that was Pope John XIX (1024-32), who was additionally really only the eighteenth pope named John. The story of the uncompromising pope on collision course with a united Franciscan Order has often been told, most memorably by Umberto Eco in The Name of the Rose. In this book, the author sets out to investigate the Franciscan Cardinal Bertrand de la Tour, a man apparently torn between the pope who was his patron and the Order to which he had devoted his life. His discovery of Bertrand's significance undermines the common scholarly understanding of this episode and of the character of John XXII himself. He provides a major reinterpretation of the apostolic poverty controversy that has far-reaching consequences for issues such as papal infallibility, natural rights theory, and Ockham's political writings.The religious bacground is ruled by the protagonists Pope John XXII (1249 - December 4, 1334),who was pope from 1316 to 1334. He was the second Pope of the Avignon Papacy. The Pope opposed Louis IV of Bavaria as emperor, and Louis, in turn invaded Italy, and set up an antipope, Nicholas V. Pope John XXII had set a constitution concerning the taxae sacrae poenitentiariae in which the pope exploited the sins of the religious in order to squeeze out more money by creating the indulgence. However the Franciscans had a vow of poverty and opposed this doctrine, thus the Pope wanted to declare them heretics because for him the Franciscan belief was not good in reorganizing the Church. Pope John, on the other hand, had need of large revenues, not only for the maintenance of his Court, but particularly for the wars in Italy. John XXII, Roman Catholic Pope from 1316 to 1334, was born at Cahors, France, in 1249. In 1300 he was elevated to the episcopal by Pope Boniface VIII at the instance of the king of Naples, and in 1308 was made chancellor of Naples by Charles, retaining this office under Charles's successor, Robert of Anjou. In 1310 Pope Clement V summoned Jacques to Avignon and instructed him to advise upon the affair of the Templars and also upon the question of condemning the memory of Boniface VIII. Jacques decided on the legality of suppressing the order of the Templars, holding that the pope would be serving the best interests of the Church by pronouncing its suppression; but he rejected the condemnation of Boniface as a sacrilegious affront to the Church and a monstrous abuse of the lay power. On the 23rd of December 1312 Clement appointed him cardinal-bishop of Porto, and it was while cardinal of Porto that he was elected pope, on the 7th of August 1316. John's pontificate was continually disturbed by his conflict with Louis of Bavaria and by the theological revolt of the Spiritual Franciscans. Louis was gradually recognized by the whole of Germany, especially after his victory at Mühldorf (1322), and gained numerous adherents in Italy, where he supported the Visconti, who had been condemned as heretics by the Pope. John affected to ignore the successes of Louis, and on the 8th of October 1323 forbade his recognition as king of the Romans. After demanding a respite, Louis abruptly appealed at Nuremberg from the future sentence of the pope to a general council (December 8, 1323). The doctrine of the rights of the lay monarchy sustained by William of Ockham and John of Paris, by Marsilius of Padua, John of Jandun and Leopold of Bamberg, was affirmed by the jurists and theologians, penetrated into the parlements and the universities, and was combated by the upholders of papal absolutism, such as Alvaro Pelayo and Alonzo Trionfo. Excommunicated on the 21st of March 1324, Louis retorted by appealing for a second time to a general council, which was held on the 22nd of May 1324, and accused John of being an enemy to the peace and the law, stigmatizing him as a heretic on the ground that he opposed the principle of evangelical poverty as professed by the strict Franciscans. From this moment Louis appeared in the character of the natural ally and even the protector of the Spirituals against the persecution of the Pope. On the 11th of July 1324 the Pope laid under an interdict the places where Louis or his adherents resided, but this bull had no effect in Germany. Equally futile was John's declaration (April 3, 1327) that Louis had forfeited his crown and abetted heresy by granting protection to Marsilius of Padua. In 1317, in execution of a bull of Clement V, the royal vicariate in Italy had been conferred by John on Robert of Anjou, and this appointment was renewed in 1322 and 1324, with threats of excommunication against any one who should seize the vicariate of Italy without the authorization of the Pope. One of John's last acts was his decision to separate Italy from the Empire, but this bull was of no avail and fell into oblivion. On the third Sunday in Advent 1329, and afterwards in public consistory, John had preached that the souls of those who have died in a state of grace go into Abraham's bosom, sub altari Dei, and do not enjoy the beatific vision (visio facie ad faciem) of the Lord until after the Last Judgment and the Resurrection; and he had even instructed a Minorite friar, Gauthier of Dijon, to collect the passages in the Fathers which were in favor of this doctrine. The theologians in Louis's following who were opposed to papal absolutism already spoke of "the new heretic, Jacques de Cahors", and reiterated with increasing insistency their demands for the convocation of a general council to try to change for another Pope. John appears to have retracted shortly before his death, which occurred on the 4th of December 1334. John had kindled very keen animosity, not only among the upholders of the independence of the lay power, but also among the upholders of absolute religious poverty, the exalted Franciscans. Clement V, at the council of Vienne, had attempted to bring back the Spirituals to the common rule by concessions; John, on the other hand, in the bull Quorundam exigit (April 3, 1317), adopted an uncompromising and absolute attitude, and by the bull Gloriosam ecciesiam (January 23, 1318) condemned the protests which had been raised against the bull Quorundam by a group of seventy-four Spirituals and conveyed to Avignon by the monk Bernard Délicieux. These were immediately hailed as martyrs, and in the eyes of the exalted Franciscans at Naples and in Sicily and the south of France the pope was regarded as antichrist. The bull Quia nonnunquam (March 26, 1322) defined the derogations from the rule punished by the pope, and the bull Cum inter nonnullos (November 12, 1323) condemned the proposition which had been admitted at the general chapter of the Franciscans held at Perugia in 1322, according to which Christ and the Apostles were represented as possessing no property, either personal or common. The Pope, by the bull Quia quorundam (November 10, 1324), cited Michael to appear at Avignon at the same time as Ockham and Bonagratia. All three fled to the court of Louis of Bavaria (May 26, 1328), while the majority of the Franciscans made submission and elected a general entirely devoted to the Pope. But the resistance, aided by Louis and merged as it now was in the cause sustained by Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, became daily bolder. Treatises on poverty appeared on every side; the party of Ockham clamored with increasing imperiousness for the condemnation of John by a general council; and the Spirituals, confounded in the persecution with the Beghards and with Fraticelli of every description, maintained themselves in the south of France in spite of the reign of terror instituted in that region by the Inquisition. Pope John XXII was involved in a theological controversy involving the beatific vision. John XXII continued this argument for a time in sermons while he was Pope, although he never taught this in official documents. Despite holding for many years a view widely held to be heretical, John XXII is not considered a heretic because in his day the doctrine he had contradicted had not been formally defined by the Church, a lacuna that his successor, Pope Benedict XII (1334-42), immediately filled by the encyclical Benedictus Deus, which formally defined this doctrine as part of Church teaching. Pope John XXII was also an excellent administrator and did much efficient in reorganizing the Church. John XXII has traditionally been credited with having composed the prayer 'Anima Christi, sanctifica me... On March 27, 1329 John XXII condemned many writings of Meister Eckhart as heretical in his papal bull In Agro Dominico. Probably because of the controversial antipope John XXIII, men avoided taking the regnal name John for over 600 years until the election of the other John XXIII. Immediately after John's election as Pope in 1958, there was some confusion as to whether he would be known as John XXIII or John XXIV, which he moved to immediately resolve by declaring that he would be known as John XXIII. Who are the Enemies of the Open Society? Among the enemies of open society, Popper points out the ethical positivism, a key element, though little noticed, Marxism and Nazism. Positivism ethical "claims no other standards than those laws that were actually spent (or positive) and therefore have a positive existence. Other patterns are considered as unrealistic imagination." The obvious problem with this theory is that it prevents any kind of moral challenge to existing norms and moral limit any political power. If there are no moral standards than those positivized law, the law that exists is that which must exist. This theory leads to the principle that force is the law. As such it is radically opposed to the spirit of the open society: it is based, as we saw in the possibility of criticizing and gradually alter or preserve laws and customs. The ethical positivism, to enact the lack of moral values beyond those contained in existing legal norms actually leads to the demoralization of society and, thereby, the abolition of the concept of freedom and moral responsibility of the individual. This is perhaps one of the most misunderstood aspects of the work of Popper. The idea of "openness" was captured by intellectual fashions and relativistic theories that Popper actually condemned as enemies of open society. The ethical positivism, Popper warned, generates a rampant relativism and, as the theory of popular sovereignty, paving the way for an unlimited state, a state that recognizes no moral limits. The challenge of ethical relativism leaves mankind in doubt about the standards with which it can critique the ethics of a different society on account of the fact that the theory states that societies develop ethics in order to cope with both their physical, and social environments. The central tenet of the dogma is that there is no universal truth in ethics, and therefore critics speak in vain when criticizing the ethics of another society; rather, the critic ought to tolerate the ethics of another society because the ethics he obeys, and those that he critiques developed in two different environments. However, ethical relativism can lead mankind down a path to aberrant ethical positivism where the only standard of ethics are the existing ethics of the day thus denying man the capability of improving his society via reason. In fact, the entire concept of tolerance, while it is certainly a keystone to an open society in which individuals of differing judgments of value (especially ones of a metaphysical character) can unite in the division of labor that is the engine of prosperity, should not hinder man from critiquing himself, his society, or that of others. There is absolutely no reason to uphold the status-quo as the absolute best of all outcomes. This process should provide an alternative to the utopia promised, for exemple, by terrorists-to the open society, and it gives Muslims, like Christians and Jews, an opportunity to liberate themselves from the ever-present menace of hell, which is the single most effective threat the fundamentalists employ. And yet suggestions like this cause many people in the west to flinch. Many hold that questioning, or criticising, a holy figure is not polite behaviour, somehow not done. This cultural relativism betrays the basic values on which our open society is constructed. We should never self-censor. The persistence of closed societies would be the cause of recurrent wars, said Bergson, but wars among themselves rather than wars waged by closed societies against open ones. For Popper the impulse to the closed society would be the cause of recurrent revolt against freedom and reason within societies that were trying to make the transition from one condition to the other. Whatever the current object of adulation- the wisdom of the East, tribal Africa, Aboriginal Australia, pre-Columbian America -the message is the same: the absolute superiority of Otherness. The Third Worldist looks to the orient, to the tribal, to the primitive not for what they really are but for their evocative distance from the reality of modern European society and values. The western cultural relativists, who flinch from criticising Muhammad for fear of offending Muslims, rob Muslims of an opportunity to review their own moral values. The first victims of Muhammad are the minds of Muslims themselves. Moreover, this attitude betrays Muslim reformers who desperately require the support-and even the physical protection-of their natural allies in the west. Muslims must reform their approach to Muhammad's teachings if we are all to coexist peacefully. Terrorists and fundamentalists should not be permitted to dictate to us the rules of the game. Core western values must be maintained, and proclaimed. Our struggle should focus on persuading the large middle group of Muslims that they need not give up their religious beliefs if they engage in a process of clear and honest thinking about the need for Islamic reform. Professor Hayek also attributed the recent revival in tribalist thinking to the fact that more and more people were obliged to work in larger and larger organisations, both public and private. Globalists are committed to mass people conditioning along the lines advocated by B.F. Skinner, and in a society supplied with an abundance of material goods, in which information is carefully controlled by the mass media, and in which independent thought is discouraged from an early age by an education system which rewards conformity, it is possible to achieve that. Masses of people, through the encouragement of mental laziness and reliance on authorities, can be lulled back into bicameral mode. Once there they can be induced to believe almost anything provided it comes from an accepted authority figure or source, such as political leaders, professors of this or that, newspapers with coloured pictures, teachers in the classroom, the lyrics of pop music, or the TV. Globalists are socialists and therefore collectivists, in other words, tribalists. They view society not as many individuals, but as various tribes, pressure groups, or human resources whose interests are necessarily in conflict. They readily accept concepts such as inherited tribal guilt, guilt for past wrongs allegedly committed by people of the same tribe or race. It is therefore meaningful for them to apologise for the alleged crimes of their tribal ancestors, and to try to persuade others to do likewise. They are obsessed with issues of race, culture and group rights, while they ignore and set about abolishing individual rights. The more disturbing aspect of global tribalism lies in the adoption of policies which are having the effect of causing the masses to reject their morality and to adopt values actually threatening to themselves and their society. They can be induced to believe the butchery of defenceless civilians by NATO is a humanitarian action, that war-making is peacekeeping, and that it is wrong to judge people who do such things because moral rules are merely an outmoded form of social control, a conspiracy by naughty people from the old individualist order. Faced with ideas seemingly too difficult to grapple with, they will reject them out of hand as conspiracy theories or just another person's opinion, and move on to easier things, like sport or gossip. Globalism is merely the latest version of these reactionary movements, this time striving to create one big global tribe, or global village, an attempt to recreate paleolithic tribal society on a global scale. The sociologist Edward Shils was certainly no enemy of what Sandall champions as "civilization." But in his book Tradition (dedicated, incidentally, to the spirits of Max Weber and Eliot), Shils observed that "a mistake of great historical significance has been made in modern times in the construction of a doctrine which treated traditions as the detritus of the forward movement of society." If romantic primitivism is an enemy of civilization, so too is the view that piety toward the past is always an impediment to progress. Why VS Naipaul is considered a post-colonial writer? Naipaul's project as a writer can then best be seen as one which is located in the need to come to terms with the effects of a self-imposed literary exile and the dislocations of unhousement created by the 'passing away' of Empire. This has however been less a political interest in the making and unmaking of 'Third world' societies than a psychic need to write and rewrite the self within the trauma of that history. In attempting over a long and distinguished career, to revision his location as twice-born immigrant both within Trinidad and Britain and later, in his exploration of his other 'area of darkness' - India - he has constantly shown that the stories of colonialism and its post-Imperial aftermath engendered what might be called, the continuous story of a 'narrative of anxiety'. For over and over again, it is the process of writing itself which becomes the means of travel, a performative act of intervention and survival. And it is through the craft of writing that Naipaul writes himself anew whilst at the same time revisioning the unfinished business of his past. As he sayd in his Nobel Prize address:"What was past was past. I suppose that was the general attitude. And we Indians, immigrants from India, had that attitude to the island. We lived for the most part ritualised lives, and were not yet capable of self-assessment, which is where learning begins." And continues:"The world is always in movement. People have everywhere at some time been dispossessed." His novels developed more political themes and he began to write about colonial and post-colonial societies in the process of decolonisation. These novels include The Mimic Men (1967), winner of the 1968 WH Smith Literary Award, In a Free State (1971), which won the Booker Prize for Fiction, Guerrillas (1975) and A Bend in the River (1979), set in Africa. The Enigma of Arrival (1987) is a personal account of his life in England. A Way in the World (1994), is a formally experimental narrative that combines fiction and non-fiction in a historical portrait of the Caribbean. Half a Life, was published in 2001 and follows the adventures of Indian Willie Chandran in post-war Britain, a new life initiated by a chance encounter between his father and the novelist W. Somerset Maugham. A devastatingly moving and often very funny novel from a masterful voice. In a corner of India untouched by anti-colonial agitation Willie Chandran's father stood at odds with the world - aspiring to greatness while living the dreary life marked out for him by his ancestors. In an attempt to defy his past he lives with a low-caste woman, only to find himself at the mercy of his own fury. From this unhappy union the compelling character of Willie Chandran emerges: oddly like his father, naively eager to find something that will place him both in and apart from the world. Willie is drawn to England and the immigrant community of post-war London, its dingy West End clubs and sexual encounters. But it is his first experience of love that may bring him the fulfillment he so desperately seeks. His wife Ana leads him to her homeland in Portuguese Africa, whose inhabitants are uncertainly living out the last days of colonialism. Naipaul delineates the relationship between father and son with wonderful clarity and compassion; and the comic brilliance of the London scenes and penetrating descriptions of Africa are hard to beat. Magic Seeds (2004) continues his story. The worst place of all for Naipaul, perhaps--certainly the most maddening one--is his ancestral homeland, India. The sight of thousands of beatniks, American, Australian, and whatever, flocking to a country ravaged by hunger, illiteracy, caste violence, corruption, etc., (which prompts the glossy Indian Hotelkeeper and Traveller to purr: "To some of the materially affluent but psychologically sick and spiritually rudderless foreigners from far-flung corners of the world, India's saints and sadhus provide irresistible magnets of attraction") all but unhinges Sir Vidiadhar Surajprasad. "The absurdity of India," he declares, "can be total. It appears to ridicule analysis. It takes the onlooker beyond anger and despair to neutrality." He labels its spirituality "pathetic.", as P.Heinegg afirmed. B.Bhattacharya said: " There are two immediate effects of privileging this history in Naipaul's early texts. First, such history facilitates the New World's inclusion in an ideological terrain that grows within and fills up the vacuum left by imperialism, and yet helps the indenture communities to retain their distinct and mostly Indian civilizational markers.This dual framework, though devised as a strategy after the imperial fantasy was over, inherits a peculiarly colonial view of the world. It draws from anthropological categories like civilization; however, with its central emphasis on the nation-state it also transforms this map of civilization into an ideological topography of political modernity and civility. It can also be argued that Naipaul's texts presuppose national culture as a measure of civility and modernity and as such reinvent a colonial framework in the Caribbean. Such a framework must not, however, be confused with Orientalist knowledge or the imperial "civilizing mission"; rather, the spatial politics in Naipaul's texts is a response to the formal end of empire and the widespread euphoria of decolonization after the Second World War. The second effect of this history is an imperfect repetition of Europe within the New World. Naipaul repeats the foundational moment of European modernity, the birth of the nation-state, within this fluid territory as the inevitable political destiny of the indenture community in the age of decolonization. There is little awareness that this attempt is also an uncritical valorization of a moment in imperial history; that modern empires were conceivable only when there was an attendant consciousness about the nation-states in Europe.The nation-state rather enjoys a historical inevitability in Naipaul's texts, a veritable framing to make sense of the spatial confusion that imperial capital and slave/indentured labor occasioned on a global level. The New World, with its cultures of plantation, indenture immigration, and the diaspora, is a latecomer in this ideological terrain and must follow the European model. The history of this belated space starts with the arrival of indentured laborers in these islands. Very crudely, that history appears in Naipaul's novels as an attempt to set the stage for them. "As is well known, Naipaul's reputation is checkered and increasingly uneasy. He has been called a reactionary and an Islamophobe; Derek Walcott has accused him, more in sorrow than in anger, of racism; Edward W. Said has accused him, more in anger than in sorrow, of intellectual neo-colonialism. Rather than nervously ignoring these charges, I should like to address them head on, and to say that Naipaul is a political figure-indeed, a profoundly important one.", as G.Wheatcroft put it. What is the Socrates' main reason for being punish with the death penalty? The charges against Socrates Socrates says that he has to refute two sets of accusations: the old, longstanding charges that he is a busybody, and a curious person who makes inquiries into the earth and sky, and the recent legal charges that he is guilty of corrupting the young, and of worshipping Supernatural things of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the State (18b-c). Socrates says that the old charges stemmed from years of gossip and prejudice against him and hence were difficult to address. These so called 'informal charges' Socrates puts into the style of a formal legal accusation: "Socrates is committing an injustice, in that he inquires into things below the earth and in the sky, and makes the weaker argument the stronger, and teaches others to follow his example" (18b-c). He says that these allegations are repeated in a certain comic poet, namely Aristophanes. In his play, The Clouds, Aristophanes lampooned Socrates by presenting him as the paradigm of Atheism, Science Sophism. Yet it is unlikely that Aristophanes would have intended these charges to be taken seriously, since Plato depicts Aristophanes and Socrates as being on very good terms with each other in the Symposium. Socrates says that he cannot possibly be mistaken for a sophist because they are wise (or at least thought to be) and highly paid. He says he is poor and claims to know nothing noble and good. In 399 B.C. Socrates was put on trial in an open Athenian court. He was found guilty and put to death by a 501 member jury. The events of this trial are preserved for us in Plato's Apology. Was Socrates guilty? Despite Socrates' obfuscation of the charges put against him (particularly the alleged distinction between "old charges" and "new charges"), the only charges relevant to his guilt in the trial were the so-called "new charges" put forward by Meletus: 1."corrupting the young" and 2."not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other new spiritual beings" (Apology 24b-24c). In Euthyphro, while discussing the matter immediately prior to the trial, Socrates connects the two charges, and says the indictment against him claims he corrupts the youth by his impiety (Euthyphro 3a-3b). In the Euthyphro then Socrates makes it clear that impiety is the main charge being leveled against him. In what follows I will first examine the charge of impiety and determine Socrates' guilt. The primary charge made against Socrates in Meletus' indictment is that Socrates did not believe in the gods of Athens, but other "new" gods. The fact that Meletus does not remain consistent on this charge through the trial does nothing to detract from the original accusation. First, was impiety or unorthodoxy a crime in Athens? It seems the answer is yes, though persecution was probably rare. T.H. Irwin relates the fact that "Plutarch mentions a decree moved in the Assembly by Diopeithes at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (Pericles 32.2) to prosecute those who did not recognize the gods or who taught accounts of celestial beings" (Irwin 134). Furthermore, as Irwin writes, "we have evidence of an actual prosecution for impiety in … a speech delivered at the trial of Andocides in 399. … [the prosecutor] treated impiety itself as a sufficient threat to the city to deserve death. When Socrates' accusers demanded the death penalty for impiety, they had a very recent precedent" (Irwin 136). The reasons impiety was sometimes met with open hostility are twofold: 1.Impiety led to punishment by the gods, pestilence, plague, and other disasters (see Oedipus the King), 2.Impiety, especially atheism, led to the breakdown of social morality (after all, if the gods weren't going to punish you for immorality, why be moral?). That the ancient Athenians thought that moral dereliction followed from impiety is substantiated by none other than the play Clouds, Aristophanes' comical caricature of Socrates (see Apology 19c). On line 300 of Clouds Socrates says "What gods do you intend to swear by? To start with, the gods hold no currency with us." No doubt the Socrates of Aristophanes' play is not historical, but none the less it reveals the popular Athenian perception of the moral degradation caused by impiety. So an Athenian could legitimately be punished for impiety. Was Socrates impious towards the gods and goddesses of Athens? Almost certainly. M.F. Burnyeat's "The Impiety of Socrates" was particular helpful in answering this question. Socrates' only defense against the charge of impiety in the Apology is a response to the straw man charge of atheism. Obviously Socrates was not an atheist; that wasn't even a part of the charges against him. Aside from swearing several times on traditional gods like Zeus and Hera, Socrates doesn't make explicit reference to any of the city gods. As Burnyeat notes: "All the important references to divinity in the Apology are indeterminate references to [the god] or, once or twice, to [gods]. … Socrates might as well be speaking of 'god' and 'gods' in a quite generic sense" (Burnyeat 136). It seems that Socrates does not even try to explicitly defense himself against the charges of impiety in the Apology. Outside the Apology his impiety is made all the more explicit when he basically admits to it in Euthyphro, where Socrates states that that he "finds it hard to accept" the stories about the gods (Euthyphro 6a). When Socrates' impiety is clearly established the charge of corrupting the youth follows easily. Socrates openly challenged young Athenians' conceptions of piety (see, again, Euthyphro, and its famous "dilemma"), and the youths' respect for their elders and the established social structure. Socrate's defense against this charge in the Apology is dubious, to say the least. Socrates says that he would not willingly corrupt those around him because "if I make one of my associates wicked I run the risk of being harmed by him" (Apology 25e). But this argument obviously carries no weight. It is entirely conceivable that Socrates corrupted those around him, knew that he was corrupting them through false teaching, but did not care because of some other selfish reason (like having the admiration of the city youth). Later in the Apology Socrates says: "If I corrupt some young men and have corrupted others, then surely some of them who have grown older and realized that I gave them bad advice when they were young should now themselves come up here to accuse me and avenge themselves" (Apology 33d). The irony is that just such an admission exists from one of Socrates' young followers. Republic 537e-539c is Plato's admission of the corrupting effect dialectical training can have on youth. Republic 537d-537e reads "Don't you realize what a great evil comes from dialectic as it is currently practiced? / What evil is that? / Those who practice it are filled with lawlessness. / They certainly are." Republic 539a-539c in particular warns of the deleterious effects dialectical training can have on youth. The fact that in Apology 30a Socrates admits to teaching anyone regardless of their age, coupled with what Republic 537e-539c plainly says, allows us to infer that Plato probably thought Socrates had some corrupting influence on the youth of Athens. What are the implications of the guilty verdict? It is commonly supposed that the implications rest first and foremost on our interpretation of Athens. Athens was corrupt, so the litany goes, and was unduly stifling the free expression of thought. The Athenians executed a courageous thinker who was committed only to the truth. This interpretation of the events surrounding Socrates' death unjustly presents Socrates' as a hero. But Socrates was no hero. He was neither sincere nor honest, and he certainly was not humble. Even a casual reading of the relevant texts, untainted by a subsequent tradition of double think and hero worship, reveals a deeply arrogant and obnoxious personality. More relevant to this case, Socrates, through his impiety and wanton disrespect for all the highest regarded citizens of Athens (to the point of insulting them during the trial!), openly challenged the Athenian way of life, and he was subsequently executed. Why should anyone be surprised? Given the way he acted Socrates could reasonably expect the verdict he received. Therefore the objective reader of Plato's Apology can only conclude that Socrates was either supremely arrogant or suicidal. The latter is, I must say, probably closer to the truth. If found guilty; his penalty could be death. The trial took place in the heart of the city, the jurors seated on wooden benches surrounded by a crowd of spectators. Socrates' accusers (three Athenian citizens) were allotted three hours to present their case, after which, the philosopher would have three hours to defend himself. Socrates Socrates was 70 years old and familiar to most Athenians. His anti-democratic views had turned many in the city against him. Two of his students, Alcibiades and Critias, had twice briefly overthrown the democratic government of the city, instituting a reign of terror in which thousands of citizens were deprived of their property and either banished from the city or executed. After hearing the arguments of both Socrates and his accusers, the jury was asked to vote on his guilt. Under Athenian law the jurors did not deliberate the point. Instead, each juror registered his judgment by placing a small disk into an urn marked either "guilty" or "not guilty." Socrates was found guilty by a vote of 280 to 220. The jurors were next asked to determine Socrates' penalty. His accusers argued for the death penalty. Socrates was given the opportunity to suggest his own punishment and could probably have avoided death by recommending exile. Instead, the philosopher initially offered the sarcastic recommendation that he be rewarded for his actions. When pressed for a realistic punishment, he proposed that he be fined a modest sum of money. Faced with the two choices, the jury selected death for Socrates. The philosopher was taken to the near-by jail where his sentence would be carried out. Athenian law prescribed death by drinking a cup of poison hemlock. Socrates would be his own executioner. In Plato's Apology, Socrates is on trial to defend himself against an allegation made by Meletus, a fellow Athenian. Meletus has accused Socrates of corrupting the youth of Athens by not believing in the Gods of the city-state. Socrates begins his defense by acknowledging that he also has other adversaries from the past and present. He states that their opposition is not a recent phenomenon. "These people are ambitious, violent, and numerous; they are continually and convincingly talking about me; they have been filling your ears for a long time with vehement slanders against me" (Apology, 27). Throughout his trial, Socrates addresses the true reason for his bad reputation. He challenges the allegations made against him, and declares that his accusers have not given enough thought to their claims. Socrates also explains why he never held public office, and gives an overview on the life he has chosen to live. He proclaims to his fellow Athenians that their obsession with wealth and the material world must never take precedence over the care of the soul. Socrates also discusses his inevitable sentencing to death, and gives his truthful perspective on death and the afterlife. In his trial, Socrates addresses the true reason for his bad reputation. He implies that it has nothing to do with corrupting the youth or being an atheist. "What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom, perhaps" (Apology, 24). Socrates then tells the story of his friend Chairephon, who went to an oracle when they were younger. The oracle told Chairephon that no one is wiser than Socrates. Upon hearing this, Socrates made it his duty to question men with established reputations, who were believed to be the wisest in Athens. Since his youth, Socrates' goal was to see if he could find one man truly wiser than him. Politicians, poets, and theologians were among the many he pursued. Socrates found that after examining their moral values, they were not wise, as they had appeared. "In my investigation in the service of the god I found that those who had the highest reputation were nearly the most deficient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more knowledgeable" (Apology, 26). Ultimately, Socrates earned a bad reputation because his scrutiny exposed the men's ignorance. Socrates acknowledges that there may be people wondering if he is ashamed for having an occupation that is dangerous and which may bring death. He answers this by saying, "You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or a bad man" (Apology, 31). Socrates also explains why he has led a private life, which has allowed him to practice philosophy. He explains this in two parts. First, he says he has a divine sign, which is a voice he hears that tells him when he should avoid doing something. His divine sign has been with him his whole life. On the matter of public service, the sign has steered him against it. Second, Socrates declares that if he were to enter public office, he would not have survived long. He asserts that a person who is true to their morals will reach conflict in public service, because there is no such thing as a politician who is not morally compromised. Socrates recalls the experience he had in public service. He was summoned, along with a few other citizens, to execute a man that the government had considered guilty. He says that the government "gave many such orders to many people, in order to implicate as many as possible in their guilt" (Apology, 35). Socrates immediately removed himself from involvement in this. He said it would be unethical to allow himself to be used as a tool of a totalitarian regime, which intended to spread guilt through their citizens. Most importantly, in his trial, Socrates makes a final attempt to reveal to the citizens of Athens that they are corrupting themselves by pursuing material objects and by having no concern for the state of their souls. Socrates constantly challenges the value priorities of his fellow citizens in the attempt to flip their priorities upside down. "Good sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?" (Apology, 32). Socrates believes that people place too much value on wealth, honor, prestige, and the body. He says these things are of no comparison to the most valuable, eternal, and highest good: the soul. "Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence makes wealth and everything else good for men, both individually and collectively" (Apology, 33). Socrates is saying that wealth is only valuable and worth having if you do something worthwhile with it. People should use the less valuable, material goods in a way that is subordinate with the most valuable good, the soul. Socrates attempts to reveal to the court that the soul is eternal and endures forever. He believes that it exists even before the person does. He explains that a person must bring the moral potential of his soul to actualization - to manifest the eternal goodness within, so that it gains power over the personality. When the court asks Socrates what he believes his proper punishment should be, he says it should be free meals at the Pyrataneum. This is a celebration hall for Olympian athletes. Socrates thinks he should receive high treatment like the Greek sports heroes. To Athenians, sports heroes are the source of happiness and entertainment. Socrates asserts that the happiness people get from watching sports heroes is illusory. He believes that people do not derive real happiness from it. He says that people can find true happiness by engaging in philosophy. Socrates' belief in the purity and goodness of the soul is truly revealed when he responds to his verdict, which is a sentence to death. He accepts the verdict with composure, as he had anticipated this. Socrates tells the jury that he cannot be harmed by the so-called punishment of death. It is only his physical body that can die, but his true nature is an eternal soul made of purity and goodness. His soul cannot be vanquished. He makes it clear that despite the court's verdict he will not resort to dramatic emotions or petition to live even a little longer. He does not do what other humans might do, for example, plead for more time or bring his wife and children to court so that the jury will have mercy on him. He says that his death sentence "may well be a good thing, and those of us who believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of this, for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right" (Apology, 41). Socrates offers the jury some provocative insights on the nature of death. To begin, he tells them that he is not afraid of death. He says that emotions follow from knowledge, and since he has no knowledge of what death is, he has no feelings or emotions about death. Socrates only has emotions if they are first authorized by reason, so it is illogical for him to be afraid of death when he knows nothing about it. "To fear death, gentleman, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know" (Apology, 32). Socrates asserts that there is "good hope that death is a blessing" (Apology, 41). And he has two viewpoints on what death could be. He believes that death is either an eternal, dreamless sleep where the dead do not perceive anything, or death is when the soul gets relocated to another place. To Socrates, the second possibility is the greater blessing because he will have the opportunity to go to a world where he can meet his predecessors and continue to examine and question people - to practice philosophy eternally. "I could spend my time testing and examining people there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but is not" (Apology, 41). Socrates says that it is not difficult to avoid death, but "it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death" (Apology, 40). Socrates also states that by sentencing him to death, the Athenians are not harming him. Rather, they are harming themselves. By killing him "haphazardly," they corrupt their own souls. Socrates says that though the jury condemns him to death, they are condemned "by truth to wickedness and injustice" (Apology, 40). And despite his increasingly sorrowful tone, he accepts that this is all as it should be. In the end, Socrates prophesies to those that convicted him. "I say gentleman, to those who voted to kill me, that vengeance will come upon you immediately after my death, a vengeance much harder to bear than that which you took in killing me" (Apology, 40). In reality, Socrates' accusers actually think that by putting him to death and eliminating him, they will no longer have to give an account of their lives and risk being exposed as ignorant. However, Socrates says that there are many people like him who will approach the court, who are younger and who will be resented far more than him. He ends his prophesy by saying: "You are wrong if you believe that by killing people you will prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living in the right way. To escape such tests is neither possible nor good, but it is best and easiest not to discredit others but to prepare oneself to be as good as possible" (Apology, 40). In the conclusion of his trial, Socrates states: "a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods" (Apology, 42). Socrates declares that he has led a good life, a life of morality and virtue. He states that although people have judged him and sentenced him to death, their opinions and verdicts will have no bearing on him once his body has perished. They cannot harm the most pure, true, and everlasting essence of his existence. Ancient interpretations Plato 35e - 38b Summary After some deliberation, the jury finds Socrates guilty by a vote of 280 to 221. The only surprise that Socrates registers is that the vote was so close: he expected to lose by a much wider margin. Meletus has proposed the death penalty, and Socrates is invited to propose an alternative form of punishment. True to form, Socrates does not ask himself what penalty he would like to pay, but what penalty he deserves. Considering he has occupied himself by dissuading his fellow citizens from pursuing personal ambitions and urging them instead toward mental and moral perfection, Socrates concludes he deserves a reward rather than a penalty. Accordingly, he proposes that he be given free dining in the Prytaneum, where victorious athletes are feasted during the Olympic Games. Socrates excuses what might have seemed like a joke, insisting that he cannot propose an appropriate penalty when he is convinced that he has not intentionally wronged anybody. Since he is incapable of intentionally wronging anyone, he can hardly intentionally wrong himself by proposing an unjust penalty. Even so, he rejects most of the penalties the jury might consider to be acceptable. Imprisonment would leave him to the whim of whichever magistrates were in charge of the prisons. Banishment would just send him to wander from town to town, earning resentment and expulsion from each, just as he has here. One last time, Socrates also refuses to give up his philosophizing, as it is only through this that he can do his duty to God and pursue goodness. Only through philosophy can he properly come to know himself, and it is here that he makes his famous assertion that the unexamined life is not worth living. Finally, he suggests, if he must pay a fee, that it be set at one hundred drachmae, a small fee that is barely within his limited means. At the last minute, several young admirers, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus offer some of their own money, raising the fine to three thousand drachmae. Commentary Similar to his refusal to beg the jury for mercy, Socrates refuses to beg for the death penalty to be commuted. Simply to do so for personal reasons, or out of fear, would be petty and disgraceful. The only reason for commuting the penalty would be if it were an unjust penalty. Socrates does indeed consider the penalty to be unjust, not because it is so harsh, but because it was laid down at all. His alternative, then, is not a lighter penalty, but a reward. His suggestion of being feasted like a hero of the Olympic Games is just one in a long string of comparisons he makes between himself and more generally recognized heroes. For instance, at 28c, he likens himself to Achilles, the hero of The Iliad, in his determination to fulfill his duty regardless of the danger, and at 22a, he alludes to the Labors of Hercules in connection with his own project of showing the ignorance of others. In these comparisons again, we find a form of Socratic irony. Socrates knows full well that the jury would find it perverse that he, a meddlesome busybody, should in any way resemble these legendary heroes. The irony then lies in the fact that, in many ways, he is even more beneficial to his fellow person than an Achilles or a Hercules. In reference to the victorious Olympic athletes, Socrates says, "these people give you the semblance of success, but I give you the reality" (36d). While heroic feats might allow us to admire and bask in perfection, Socrates teaching allows us to strive for perfection ourselves. (This distinction between semblances and reality possibly foreshadows Plato's later teaching, where the difference between illusion and reality, between the imperfect world of matter and the perfect, transcendent world of forms, is central.) Socrates' claim that the unexamined life is not worth living makes a satisfying climax for the deeply principled arguments that Socrates presents on behalf of the philosophical life. The claim is that only in striving to come to know ourselves and to understand ourselves do our lives have any meaning or value. Again, goodness is associated with wisdom, making the life of the philosopher--the lover of wisdom--the most desirable life of all. If we refuse to question ourselves and the world, we will act without reason, unable to distinguish between good actions and bad actions. Without philosophy, Socrates might argue, humans are no better off than animals. The good life is one in which we make both ourselves and those around us happier and better off, and the only way to pursue that life is to pursue wisdom and self-knowledge. If Socrates were to give up philosophizing, he would be abandoning the examined life, and without wisdom or self-knowledge he would be better off dead. 38c - 42a Summary After Socrates' brief and rather flippant request for the death penalty to be commuted, the jury votes to put Socrates to death. This time, the margin is greater--over two thirds--in contrast to the narrow margin that found Socrates guilty. Socrates now makes his final address to the jury before being led off to prison. He warns those that sentenced him that they will hereafter be blamed for putting a wise man to death. If only they had had a little patience, he suggests, he would have died without their help; after all, he already an old man of seventy. He reflects that perhaps he might have saved himself by saying whatever was necessary to secure his acquittal, of weeping or appealing to the jury's mercy. However, he has not done so for lack of ingenuity, but for lack of impudence: he would be disgracing himself and the court if he were to make such appeals. The difficulty, as he sees it, is not to outrun death, but to outrun wickedness, which is a far more dogged pursuer. Socrates accepts that he has been outrun by death, but points out that, unlike him, his accusers have been outrun by wickedness. While he has been condemned to death by a human jury, his accusers have been convicted of depravity and injustice by no less a tribunal than Truth herself. He is happier accepting his sentence than theirs, and considers this to be a fair sentence. He finishes his address to those who voted against him with a stern prophecy. Though they may have managed to silence him in the hopes that they can continue to live free of criticism, he will be replaced by even more critics who until now have kept silent. Socrates warns his accusers that in order to live free of criticism, one must behave well rather than stop the mouths of one's critics. Socrates then addresses those who voted to acquit him, to reconcile themselves to his fate. He remarks that the divine voice that often warns him against harmful actions has remained silent throughout the trial and throughout his own speech. From this he concludes that perhaps death is a blessing, since his sign would have opposed him unless his actions were to bring about a good result. After all, Socrates reasons, death is either annihilation--a complete and final sleep--or death is a transmigration, where his soul would live on somewhere else. If death is annihilation, it is to be looked forward to as we would look forward to a deep, restful sleep. On the other hand, if death is a transmigration to some sort of afterlife, that afterlife will be populated by all the great figures of the past, from Homer to Odysseus. Socrates remarks how delightful it would be to pass amongst these great figures, questioning them regarding their wisdom. The conclusion Socrates reaches, then, is that the good man has nothing to fear either in this life or the next. He denies any grudge against his accusers, even though they seek his life, and asks his friends to look after his three sons and to make sure that they always put goodness above money or other earthly trappings. Socrates concludes with the famous phrase: "Well, now it is time to be off, I to die and you to live; but which of us has the happier prospect is unknown to anyone but God" (42a). Commentary We find another interesting application of Socratic irony in Socrates' assertion that he would be showing impudence if he were to weep and beg for mercy. To the jury, he would have been showing impudence by not doing so and defiantly maintaining his position. The fact is, Socrates does show impudence to the court, but this kind of impudence is of little value or interest to Socrates. When he speaks of impudence, he refers to impudence before the much higher tribunals of Truth and goodness. He would be compromising his dignity and his duty to truth if he were to so debase himself. Socrates then is ultimately condemned by this jury because he does not speak to them, but to the truth. His moral position in general is one of always trying to be just and honest rather than to please his fellow person, knowing that even if he irritates others, he is ultimately doing them good by living justly and truthfully. Socrates' warning that he will be replaced, and by many, is a curious one. Only a bit earlier, at 31a, he warns the jury not to condemn him, as he will not be easy to replace. Now he suggests that he is quite replaceable, and that the jury will not solve their problem at all by putting him to death. Perhaps we see here that Socrates does indeed change his tactics and his position in order to avoid death. Before he was sentenced, he argued that he was irreplaceable in an attempt to convince the jury not to sentence him. Once he was sentenced, he warned the jury they would only be causing themselves more headaches if they put him to death--perhaps another attempt to get them to change their verdict. Though it can be supported with textual evidence, this reading is not a desirable one; it would contradict so much of what Socrates has said about not fearing death and maintaining his position that it would drastically weaken the force and integrity of his words. Perhaps a better reading comes from asking what rhetorical effects Plato was aiming for in these two different passages. At 31a, Plato is honoring Socrates, his great mentor, pointing out that he is unique among thinkers, and completely original. Here, at 39c-d, Plato is alluding to himself and many of the other pupils of Socrates who became active after Socrates' death, writing Socratic dialogues and passing on his teachings. Socrates' claim, at 39d, that these new critics will be younger and harsher is borne out by The Apology itself, in which Plato provides a damning criticism of Meletus and the Athenian justice system. Furthermore, the seemingly inconsistent claims at 31a and 39c-d can be reconciled in this reading. Plato is right in saying that Socrates is unique and original: no one like him has appeared in the subsequent two-and-a- half millennia. On the other hand, it is also true that his influence did breed a whole new generation of critics. In fact, Socrates almost single- handedly gave birth to the Western rational philosophical tradition, and if all philosophers that have come since are following in his footsteps, his form of criticism has multiplied exponentially. Socrates' attitude toward death and the afterlife is fleshed out in far greater detail in Plato's Phaedo, a more mature work that deals primarily with the question of the immortality of the soul. In this dialogue, Socrates' uncertainty is gone, and he is quite convinced that his soul will live on in the afterlife. This contrast between The Apology and the Phaedo is illustrative of the contrast between the early and more mature works of Plato. An early work, The Apology centers more around Socrates' philosophical opinions, which, as he so persistently claims, are agnostic regarding any factual questions. As Plato developed his own voice, he began increasingly to speculate on more metaphysical and epistemological questions, and used Socrates as more of a mouthpiece for putting forward his own views. Thus, in the later Phaedo, we see Socrates claiming to have positive knowledge of what happens after death. As for The Apology, Socrates concludes in typical manner, acknowledging that he does not, and cannot, know for certain what awaits him after death. Athens had just come through a difficult period, where a Sparta-supported group, called the Thirty_Tyrants had overturned the city's participatory democracy and sought to impose oligarchic rule. The fact that Critias, the leader of the Tyrants, was one of Socrates's pupils was not seen as a coincidence. His friends tried to make excuses, but the view of the Athenians was probably that expressed by the orator Aeschines some years later, when, in a prosecution speech, he wrote: "Did you not put to death Socrates the sophist, fellow citizens, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who overthrew the democracy?" Modern interpretations The death of Socrates, as presented by Plato, has inspired writers, artists and philosophers in the modern world, in a variety of ways. For some, the execution of the man Plato called 'the wisest and most just of all men' has shown the unreliability or undesirability of democratic rule. For others, the Athenians' action was a justifiable defense of their recently re-established democracy.[1) I._F._Stone, an American journalist, wrote a book entitled "Trial of Socrates" after his retirement, arguing that Socrates wanted to be sentenced to death in order to justify his opposition to the Athenian democracy, and that Socrates felt that old age would be unpleasant anyway. Waterfield, too, argues that Socrates' death was a voluntary action motivated by a greater purpose. In Waterfield's version, Socrates "saw himself as healing the city's ills by his voluntary death."[2)He argues that Socrates, with his unconventional methods, attempted to resolve the political confusion in Athens. Therefore, he was willing to serve as a "scapegoat," so that Athens could set aside old disputes and move forward in a new, more harmonious direction.[3) 1. I.F. Stone. The Trial of Socrates, 1988. 2. Waterfield,Robin. Why Socrates Died:Dispelling the Myths. New York:W.W. Norton and Company,2009. 204. 3. Waterfield,Robin. Why Socrates Died:Dispelling the Myths. New York:W.W. Norton and Company,2009. How did Vladimir Lenin stay in power? The former Soviet Union under the command of Lenin, would have become a democracy, had he not died prematurely as a result of injuries from a terrorist attack? If the circumstances of the Civil War, had not caused a closure of the political system, there would be chance for a new kind of democracy under the leadership of Lenin? In other words, any chance for the survival of Communist theory of power out of the Stalinist deformations? What are Ha Jin's Contributions? Ha Jin is a novelist born in China and now living in USA. His major contribution is to show the development of political situation in China especially related to the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Tianamen Square massacre. Ha Jin's new book, The Crazed, addresses a wide range of philosophical, moral, political, and historical issues, while maintaining a tight plot, lyrical style, and convincing, engaging characters. The Crazed is the story of Jian, a graduate student in literature at a provincial Chinese university. His mentor and future father-in-law, Mr. Yang, has a sudden stroke, and Jian is assigned to care for him. In another passage, Mr. Yang, persecuted by Communism and academia alike, says, "I'm only afraid I'm not worthy of my own suffering," and Jian remarks, "His assertion made my gums itch;" Jian's anxious responses to Mr. Yang range from the trivial to the coldly academic. Jin masterfully illustrates how Jian, like Mr. Yang before him, hides behind intellectualism, political fervor, and cynicism to avoid confronting the irreconcilable conflicts between desire and duty in 1989 China. Jian's perplexed and increasingly tormented response to the dilemmas presented by Mr. Yang leaves him with no option but to make a desperate attempt to flea China and abandon the system that has given him such disturbing non-choices. Jin partially loses control of his narrative toward the end, when the sudden burst of action, and Jian's new found political involvement, make the book feel too much like a documentary. A vigil at the bedside of a beloved teacher and mentor challenges, then changes the course of, a young graduate student's life: the deeply felt "new" novel by Chinese-born American author Ha Jin (Waiting , 1999, etc.). exams when his department "assigns" him to help care for eminent Professor Yang (also the father of Jian's fiancee, Meimei), who has suffered a debilitating stroke. Professor Yang's bitterness and despair gradually induce Jian to forsake his own studies, in favor of a "useful" life of activism (an ambition sharpened during a brief trip to the country, a development that seems to belong to another novel altogether). And Ha Jin contrives several subtle foreshadowing indicating that Jian will not succeed in living a life "outside politics". Ha Jin's powerful new novel is at once an unblinking look into the bell jar of communist Chinese society and a portrait of the eternal compromises and deceptions of the human state. When the venerable professor Yang, a teacher of literature at a provincial university, has a stroke, his student Jian Wan is assigned to care for him. Just how much delicacy becomes clear when Yang begins to rave. Are these just the outpourings of a broken mind, or is Yang speaking the truth-about his family, his colleagues, and his life's work? As it is told through the first person we as the reader discover shocking moments which leads Jian to question his future from details of Mr Yang's past. Meimei, Mr Yang's daughter, doesn't largely feature in the novel but letters are passed between herself and Jian keeping everyone updated on the political situation in Beijing. As Jian tells the story we only find out pieces of a story and Jian tries to fit them together. The novel began in more of a political way but gradually seemed to wear down to a much more personal tale continually alternating between visiting Mr Yang in hospital and Jian's life away from him. Ha Jin has done extremely well with this novel and I was disappointed that it had to end. Jian Wan had hoped to follow in Mr. Yang's footsteps, and is even engaged to his daughter, Meimei. Ha Jin's first book, Waiting appeared several years ago. If you are really interested in some fine writing out of the New China School, we recommend -- while Waiting about for Ha Jin's next thriller on love and politics among the workers in a North Chinese pickled soybean factory -- that you give Da Chen's Colors of the Mountain a try. Ha Jin, the National Book Award-winning author of Waiting, in The Craze revisits connection between insanity and sagacity in his new novel, The Craze. Jian Wan is the protagonist of Yang, an ailing professor of literature. Jian is also engaged to marry Yang's ambitious daughter, Meimei, who expects Jian to follow in her father's academic footsteps. Yang persuades Jian to abandon years of study, and Jian resolves to become an actual, rather than a glorified, clerk a knife rather than meat. Even though it was her father who led Jian astray, Meimei calls Jian a coward and gives him the slip. As Jian plummets into apostasy, pro-democracy demonstrators are massing in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The dying professor offers lengthy orations in praise of Canada and the United States, and Ha Jin himself, a professor of English at Boston University, praised America as a land of generosity and abundance in his National Book Award acceptance speech. But Ha Jin's new novel proves him a laudable exception to this rule. In some ways The Craze is one long thank-you note to Ha Jin's new home, and a Dear John letter to the China he left behind. According to Ha Jin, the BBC reported 5,000 deaths; official China, not surprisingly, reported zero.

Terça-feira, Novembro 09, 2010

TibetInfoNet - Update

TibetInfoNet - Update

I prefer to think that all this uproar is merely the result of late growth of Buddhism in the contemporary world. It may be that all this is just a jealous rage. Secretly I think even the Dalai Lama prays for Shugden. He just does not want to open this cult, fearing it to be used for other purposes. It's part of it the belief that any prayer made to Shugden is serviced. I believe that to avoid contradictions and provide only Shugden requests for HH is that this cult is prohibited. However, according to Buddhism, we know that whatever we ask will result in karmic reaction, first, to those who ask. Therefore, the Dalai Lama should not fear the claims because the merits are of each. Fear is always a bad adviser.

Quinta-feira, Outubro 21, 2010

Walled In: Spatial Immobility in American Culture

Paper presented at “Mobility in American Culture” Conference
June 20-22, 2002
University of Bologna
Walled In: Spatial Immobility in American Culture
by Geoffrey Green
San Francisco State University
“I got to keep movin’/ I got to keep movin’/ blues fallin’ down like hail....And the days keeps on worryin’ me/ there’s a hellhound on my trail”: so sang Robert Johnson on his classic 1937 recording, “Hellhound on My Trail,” capturing in words and music the drive towards mobility that has long been recognized as a significant theme in American culture. Relentless motion has epitomized the American quest for life, liberty, and personal individuality. We associate these themes with Walt Whitman’s refrain (#46) in Leaves of Grass (1855): “I know I have the best of time and space—and that I was never measured, and never will be measured..... I tramp a perpetual journey....Not I, not any one else can travel that road for you, you must travel it
for yourself....Shoulder your duds, and I will mine, and let us hasten forth” (Whitman, 2373). An individual journey that is “perpetual,” representing life itself, mastering “time and space” and resisting measurement and classification: these are the long-established tropes of American mobility. Such classic American novels as Melville’s Moby Dick, Clemens’ Huckleberry Finn (wherein Huck plans at the novel’s end to “light out for the territory ahead of the rest” [Clemens,366]), Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, Kerouac’s On the Road represent the desire to “hasten forth,” on a new path, in search of new prospects, new opportunities for fulfillment, realization,and personal expression.
But Robert Johnson’s narrator is not setting out voluntarily, not proudly “hasten[ing]forth”; rather, he is haunted, pursued by a tempest of emotional torment that pounds him like a hailstorm—he is chased by a hellhound (the mythological equivalent of Cerberus, a dog with three heads and a dragon tail) seeking to capture him and drag him down to the Kingdom of the Dead (in accordance with ancient Greek and Roman mythology) (Hamilton, 39). This individual is not setting out on a grand journey of self-discovery: he is desperate, tormented, obsessed,
frightened, and mortified. All he may hope for is a temporary respite, a moment of solace, for (as Johnson sings in his 1936 recording, “Come On in My Kitchen”) “it’s goin’ to be rainin’outdoors”—thereafter, the narrator will have to move again (“got to keep movin’”) in a desperate flight that has no beginning and no end. What a different sort of mobility than Whitman envisioned in Leaves of Grass!
This contradiction between two visions of mobility—the dominant optimism of
Whitman’s quest for identity and opportunity compared to the relentless fatalism of Robert Johnson’s flight from self-reckoning—underscores the fact that there has also been a clearlyestablished counter-tradition in American culture, one that renders mobility as pointless and futile and instead focuses on immobility in relation to the anxiety concerning fulfillment of identity, love, and personal integrity. We may recognize this theme of immobility most readily in Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener” (1853) with its focus on “pallid hopelessness” (Melville, 1975), its depiction of a characteristic window “with no view at all,” facing “within three feet...a wall” (Melville, 1956), Bartleby’s statement that he “like[s] to be stationary” (Melville, 1972),and the story’s concluding phrase that links Bartleby and all humanity with “on errands of life,
these letters speed to death” (Melville, 1975). We may term this an overt artistic expression of immobility. But this distinctly American drive toward immobility may be isolated as well in statements of American culture that, on their surface, claim an affinity with a Whitmanesque mobility. The overt artistic expressions of immobility, combined with those fatalistic and existentialist refrains of mobility that end up embracing the opposite value of immobility, together establish a clear counter-tradition of immobility as an ironic foil, an antithesis to the
dominant mythic theme of mobility in American culture. Chuck Berry’s “Promised Land” (1964), written while Berry was incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, MO, for purported violation of the Mann Act, describes—
in a little over 2 minutes—a journey that navigates the entire United States: from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The narrator departs his “home in Norfolk, Virginia” and journeys— by means of bus, train, and airplane—to the “Promised Land” of Los Angeles, CA. Along the way, the narrator travels through: North Carolina (Raleigh, Charlotte); Georgia (Atlanta);
Alabama (Birmingham); Mississippi; Louisiana (New Orleans); Texas (Houston); New Mexico(Albuquerque)—before arriving in Los Angeles. The musical narrative is often lauded for its Whitmanesque spirit that sets out across the country with a sense of aspiration, a dream of success, and an announcement of arrival at the quested-for location. This affirmative reading of positive mobility is supported by Berry’s use of Biblical metaphors: the “Promised Land” is the land of Canaan, the sought-after homeland for the Biblical Israelites: thus, the narrator seeks a righteous destination, one worth searching for and meriting a quest. The “swing low, chariot”
description of the narrator’s airplane further exploits the intertextual association to the well known African-American spiritual, “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot,” with its persistent refrain: “comin’ for to carry me home” and its connotation that that “home” is “over Jordan” (that is,Canaan) or else, Heaven (as an allegory during American slavery).
But a closer reading of the song reveals several intriguing aspects: first of all, the breakneck speed of the music evokes a sense of desperation and urgency; secondly, aside from the phrase “California on my mind,” there is no expressed reason for the narrator’s frantic mobility. Instead, after he makes the initial decision to leave Norfolk for Los Angeles, things happen to him: his bus breaks down and he’s stranded in Birmingham; his train takes him to New Orleans which he yearns to leave for undisclosed reasons; in Houston he gets the help he needs to fly to Los Angeles. There is the sense of wonderment at the possibilities of motion and
speed in modern America, but there is little sense of a goal, a quest, an ideal that underlies the goal of self-knowledge or personal fulfillment. When the narrator’s plane lands in Los Angeles,after a frenetic journey that is even exhausting to hear about, let alone experience, the narrator rushes to the telephone in the airport terminal and instructs the operator to call a number in Norfolk: “Tell the folks back home, ‘this is the Promised Land calling and the Poor Boy’s on the line!’” So the song ends—with a “rub it in their faces” proclamation to the people he fled from in Norfolk: it is as if the narrator has not arrived, cannot begin to fathom the significance of his journey or his mobility until he first gauges the envious reaction of his hometown neighbors to his implied success.
How is this a purposeful mobility? It is important to remember that Berry’s home was St.Louis and not Norfolk and that he wrote the song (along with several others evoking mobility)while confined in prison in Missouri. The song describes a desperate flight to escape from the American South, written by a musician whose career had been blindsided in part from complications resulting from his ownership of the racially-integrated Club Bandstand in St.Louis (the basis for his Mann Act trial). Berry’s first trial was declared void because of theracism of the judge, but the second trial produced the same guilty verdict. It is possible to read
the movement in the song as a fantasy of freedom while in confinement, a desire to escape from the bigotry that then characterized the American South, and a desire to remind the “folks back home” (wherever home may be) that the “poor boy” has now made it to the “Promised Land.”
Moses, we may recall, was not allowed to reach the Promised Land but only was able to glimpse it from Mt. Pisgah before he died. In his song, Berry is able to construct a version of himself as Moses, delivering his musical heritage to posterity with a desperate flight back to freedom.
But the irony of the song’s conclusion (nothing about the Promised Land, only the placing of the phone call that announces his arrival and suggests he will gloat to the people from whom he fled) associates Berry’s song of mobility not with a Whitmanesque journey of
discovery, but rather with a sense of ironic motion that undermines the purposeful basis of mobility itself. Berry’s confined-fantasy of motion is thus more in tune with Thoreau’s 1850 entry from The Journal: “Nature is as far from me as God, and sometimes I have thought to go West after her.... From time to time I overlook the promised land, but I do not feel that I am travelling toward it” (Thoreau, 1491). Motion is most fully contemplated while “stationary,” like Bartleby; mobility, in other words, may engender immobility: and while immobile, one conjures
visions of mobility.
In John Barth’s 1958 novel, The End of the Road, the narrator Jacob Horner has an
experience of immobility that takes place on his 28th birthday: he had completed the academic
courses and the oral exams for his master’s degree, but had not commenced his M.A. thesis (the
portion of the work that would display his own individualized vision); he decides to take a trip
and goes to Baltimore’s Pennsylvania Station. He informs the ticket seller how much money he
has to spend and receives 4 possible destinations—all in Ohio. Then we arrive at this account of
his immobility:
So I left the ticket window and took a seat on one of the benches in the middle of
the concourse to make up my mind. And it was there that I simply ran out of
motives, as a car runs out of gas. There was no reason to go to Cincinnati, Ohio.
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There was no reason to go to Crestline, Ohio. Or Dayton, Ohio; or Lima, Ohio.
There was no reason, either, to go back to the apartment hotel, or for that matter
to go anywhere. There was no reason to do anything. My eyes, as Winckelmann
said inaccurately of the eyes of the Greek statues, were sightless, gazing on
eternity, fixed on ultimacy, and when that is the case there is no reason to do
anything—even to change the focus of one’s eyes. Which is perhaps why the
statues stand still. It is the malady cosmopsis, the cosmic view, that afflicted me.
When one has it, one is frozen like the bullfrog when the hunter’s light
strikes him full in the eyes, only with cosmopsis there is no hunter, and no quick
hand to terminate the moment—there’s only the light. (68-69)
Jacob Horner remains immobile, paralyzed, in conflict as to the ultimate basis for choosing any
movement from among the vast assortment of possible selections he might designate. He is
snapped from this spell with the help of the Doctor, a non-licensed physician with an existential
bent, who reminds him that the point of life is motion itself: purposeful motion is less important
than that we move—life, when viewed contemplatively at its completion, is the collection of all
the choices and movements we made; these are best interpreted after we have made the choices
and not before. Focusing on purpose leads one to immobility and paralysis since there is no
ultimate reason for making one choice over another in the face of existential absurdity and the
certainty of death.
Bob Dylan reflects this same theme of ironic motionlessness in his 1970 song, “Time
Passes Slowly.” The narrator is contemplative, reflective, “up here in the mountains.” He recalls
a past “sweetheart...fine and good-lookin’” with whom he sat “while her mama was cookin’”: the
narrator, in the midst of this serene and idyllic moment, “stared out the window to the stars high
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above”; he reveals surprisingly that one reason time passed slowly for him was because he was,
even then, “searchin’ for love.” At this point, the narrator vocalizes the song’s bridge:
Ain’t no reason to go in a wagon to town,
Ain’t no reason to go to the fair.
Ain’t no reason to go up, ain’t no reason to go down,
Ain’t no reason to go anywhere.
This is Dylan’s narrator’s version of cosmopsis, but, as if to undermine it, there is a musical
interlude in which Dylan’s piano becomes more forceful, percussive, and suggestive of march
rhythms. The band’s playing becomes progressively louder, and the tempo becomes more
insistent, slightly faster: the insinuation is that some sort of movement is created from out of this
tribute to immobility. When the song resumes, the narrator again emphasizes that “time passes
slowly” but now describes himself as being “up here in the daylight”; he is trying, he asserts, “so
hard to stay right.” Evoking a “red rose of summer that blooms in the day,” he bemoans that
“time passes slowly and fades away,” but the song stumbles along, after the vocal, with a
succession of rhythmic highhat walking cadences before tapering off into oblivion. The entire
ode to the slowness of time takes a little over 2 minutes.
If “time passes slowly and [ultimately] fades away,” what should one do? Once again, the
music undermines and ironizes the literal sense of the lyrics. Movement is impelled musically as
the narrator pays tribute to the pleasures of meandering, contemplating, and biding time. “Time
Passes Slowly” was written in Woodstock, NY, during a period wherein Dylan had ceased
touring, ceased being “on the road,” in order, first, to recuperate from the very serious
motorcycle accident that had hospitalized him; and then, second, to think about life and its
significance. (Could “try hard to stay right” relate to avoiding the frantic movement that may
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place one in a hospital bed?) If the sensual pleasures that Dylan’s narrator describes (“we sit
beside bridges and walk beside fountains/Catch the wild fishes that float through the stream”) are
so fulfilling, why does he need to summon forth the memory of the past sweetheart? More
importantly, why does he describe all of this philosophical meditation as being “lost in a dream”?
Here we are reminded of the poem Edgar Allan Poe wrote in the last year of his life, 1849, “A
Dream Within a Dream”: in that short poem, Poe first proclaims, like Dylan’s narrator, that “All
that we see or seem/Is but a dream within a dream”; but then, like Dylan’s musical interpretation,
Poe’s narrator considers the fearful effect of such a proclamation. Staring at a “surf-tormented
shore,” the narrator wonders whether he might be able to “save/One [grain of sand] from the
pitiless wave”; he asks, in anxiety and dread: “Is all we see or seem/But a dream within a
dream?” (Poe, 1645). The vision of life as a dream renders all motion meaningless;
simultaneously, if all motion is meaningless, then how can life be a dream: of what does it
consist if not its actions and events and their significance?
The following year, Dylan released “Watching the River Flow” (1971), an ironic embrace
of immobility coupled with voyeurism that somehow simultaneously offered a sincere
affirmation of an America spirit in fervent and dynamic motion. “What’s the matter with me?”
the narrator asks, tongue-in-cheek, “I don’t have much to say.” Instead of words, the narrator is
mystified by his own actions: “daylight” is fast approaching yet he’s still in an “all-night cafe”!
In moonlight, he walks past “where the trucks are rollin’ slow” to “sit down on this bank of sand/
And watch the river flow.”
At this point, precisely coinciding with the lyric of immobility and watching, the music
winds down to a standstill, and then, inexplicably, starts itself back up for a new verse: it is as if
the narrator has, as Barth’s Jacob Horner had expressed it, “run out of motives as a car runs out
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of gas.” But then, refueled, he keeps on moving. Does he sing the praises of watching from his
riverbank perch? No, he yearns to be “back in the city/Instead of this old bank of sand.”
Recalling an old folk song, the narrator sings, “If I had wings and I could fly,/I know where I
would go,” but instead he will “sit here so contentedly” and “watch the river flow.” How
contented can the narrator be if he wishes to be back in the city? How satisfied is he
with his voyeurism if he wants to be somewhere he is not—not in nature, but back in the city,
“with the sun beating down over the chimney tops”?
In the song’s first bridge, the narrator observes that “people [are] disagreeing...about
everything” and this “makes you stop and all wonder why”; indeed, “yesterday” the narrator
“saw somebody on the street/Who just couldn’t help but cry”: strangely, this poignant eyewitness
observation is accompanied by a joyous musical crescendo that induces musical exuberance.
Since the river will roll “no matter what gets in the way and which way the wind does blow,” the
narrator will watch “as long as it does.” In the song’s second bridge, the narrator describes
“people disagreeing everywhere you look,” but then, revealing his own ironic perspective, he
coins a deliberately contrived rhyme, calling attention to the artifice of his words: “makes you
wanna stop and read a book.” If that were not enough, the narrator continues the dubious rhyme,
at the supposed expense of deriding another observed citizen, by noting that “yesterday” he “saw
somebody on the street/That was really shook”: this time the crescendo is tumultuous and the
music suggests the pervasive, ever-flowing motion of a rushing river. The song concludes with
the motion of the band’s fervor as Dylan’s narrator embraces the stationary act of “watchin’”—
but this immobile narrator is watching mobility itself. After the fourth repetition of “watchin’ the
river flow,” the narrator and band screech once again to a halt: “I’ll sit down on this bank of
sand/And watch the river flow”—at this last word of movement, the music begins again, forcing
10
itself into activity in order to bring the song to its end.
What is Dylan’s narrator watching? He is watching a river that is relentless, eternal, and
ceaseless; it is unstoppable, unperturbable, and indomitable. Against this transcendent motion, all
individual complaints are rendered as insignificant. The narrator’s wish to be “back in the city”
where the “one I love [is] so close at hand,” the “people disagreeing,” the person “on the
street/Who just couldn’t help but cry,” the one “that was really shook”—these and all other
individual disappointments are transitory and, in comparison to the whole, relatively
insignificant. Here, Dylan’s evocation of immobility-in-motion recalls the words of Emerson in
“The Over-Soul” (1841): “man is a stream whose source is hidden” (Emerson, 1049). Emerson
affirms “a higher origin for events than the will I call mine.... When I watch that flowing river,
which, out of regions I see not, pours for a season its streams into me, I see that I am a pensioner;
not a cause, but a surprised spectator of this ethereal water” (1049). Emerson embraces an
“attitude of reception” that is akin to Dylan’s “watchin’” (1049). The concept of the rushing river
Emerson describes as: “we live in succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within
man is the soul of the whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and
particle is equally related; the eternal ONE...the act of seeing and the thing seen, the seer and the
spectacle, the subject and the object, are one” (Emerson, 1050). Mobility, then, may only be
understood by means of immobility; immobility entices us to imagine ourselves in motion.
As a final testament to this ironic foil to the mythic tradition of naive mobility, let us
consider the classic vision of Johnny Cash’s “Folsom Prison Blues” (1956). Here the narrator is
confined and incarcerated: “I’m stuck in Folsom Prison and time keeps draggin’ on.” But instead
of describing the conditions of his immobility, the narrator makes us feel the claustrophobic
imprisonment by contrasting it with the relentless mobility that goes on outside the prison walls:
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“I hear the train a-comin’, it’s rollin’ ‘round the bend...that train keeps a-rollin’, on down to San
Antone.” Meanwhile, in opposition to the speed of the railroad train in the open air, the narrator
has not “seen the sunshine since I don’t know when”; for him, “time keeps draggin’ on.”
Cash’s narrator reminds us, however, that there is every reason for him to be in prison.
His mother advised him when he was young how he should avoid guns and behave himself.
Despite this wisdom, he confesses that he “shot a man in Reno just to watch him die”: here we
are presented with the ultimate act of cynical, depraved inhumanity—causing the death of
another human being merely to observe it taking place. The narrator’s guilt is experienced when
he hears the “whistle blowin’” that signals the speeding motion of a passing train: at that sound
of freedom and mobility, the narrator, locked up and caged in, announces: “I hang my head and
cry.” But the immobility that is the narrator’s fate is beyond his ability to describe. Instead, he
conjures, in his imagination, fanciful images of the people on that rushing train as an ironic
contrast to his enforced solitude and confinement: “I bet there’s rich folks eatin’ in a fancy
dining car/They’re probably drinkin’ coffee and smokin’ big cigars”: freedom of movement is
perceived in terms of social class elevation. The narrator is tough and without self-pity; he has no
illusions about his transgression or his punishment: “I know I had it comin’, I know I can’t be
free.” What ultimately torments him, however, is precisely what he cannot be and does not have:
freedom--to be mobile, to come and go at will. “But these people keep a-movin’, and that’s what
tortures me.” Tortured by the fantasy of imaginary people in trains hurtling past his prison walls:
these images create a powerful ironic impression of the narrator’s oppressive immobility. The
song ends with a dream, a wish: “if they freed me from this prison, if that railroad train was
mine,” he would become motion itself, he would “move it on a little farther down the line.”
Mobility would take him “far from Folsom Prison,” and there he would “stay”: once free, once
12
far away, the sound of the “lonesome whistle” would “blow my blues away.” The lyrics remind
us that, in the words of Poe, “All that we see or seem/Is but a dream within a dream”: the whistle
is “lonesome” because the narrator projects his loneliness onto the train’s voice; the narrator’s
“blues”—at the misery of his enforced immobility and in penance for his transgressions—are his
present state and need to be eradicated in the future (“I’d let that lonesome whistle blow my
blues away”). But traveling will not transport the narrator to a place where his blues depart: only
his inner self can achieve that solace.
Johnny Cash’s narrator knows what Emerson asserts in “Self-Reliance” (1841): “At
home I dream that at Naples, at Rome, I can be intoxicated with beauty, and lose my sadness. I
pack my trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in Naples, and there
beside me is the stern Fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from” (Emerson, 1045).
The narrator of “Folsom Prison Blues” can only position himself logistically in relation to
himself: he is in prison here, and where he would like to be is there: “Far from Folsom Prison,
that’s where I want to stay.” Mobility entices him with the possibility of change, but the narrator
understands that mobility, for him, is impossible; he understands, with Emerson, that “change is
not amelioration. For every thing that is given, something is taken” (Emerson, 1046). For the
narrator, he “shot a man in Reno,” and now there is no more mobility, there is only time...”and
time keeps draggin’ on.” What will break that relentless cycle of mobility inducing immobility
and motionlessness conjuring movement? When will the narrator again see the “sunshine” of
individual peace? His journey, regardless of whether it involves mobility or immobility, is a
navigation of time: he must appreciate, as does Emerson, that: “Society is a wave. The wave
moves onward, but the water of which it is composed, does not. The same particle does not rise
from the valley to the ridge. Its unity is only phenomenal. The persons who make up a
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nation to-day, next year die, and their experience with them.... Nothing can bring you peace but
yourself. Nothing can bring you peace but the triumph of principles” (Emerson, 1047-1048).
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